Monday, May 11, 2015

Carlos Santiago Nino against Hayek

In Argentina Friedrich Hayek is often dismissed as a mere defender of privilege. But in the early 90's an academic, Carlos Santiago Nino, still thought it necessary to provide some arguments before rejecting Hayek's ideas. I would like to examine Nino's objections to the notion of spontaneous order.

Carlos Santiago Nino (1943–1993, link to the wikipedia) was an Argentine jurist and philosopher. He was very influential in the 80s, especially when Argentina returned to democracy after the defeat in the Falklands war. He became personal assistant to President Ricardo Alfonsin and coordinator of the Council for the Consolidation of Democracy, a body created by the new government for the purpose of designing institutional reforms.
Nino was what Americans call “a liberal”. He took the ideas of the academics that dominated the American and British universities –among others, John Rawls, Joseph Raz, and Jeremy Waldron– summarized them and made them popular among Argentine academics. Most importantly, in a country in which few people are able to read English, he put everything in Spanish. But he didn't just copy; though it is true that he adopted the theories that were already influential in American and British universities in his time (and remain dominant today), he was a capable thinker himself.
Nino accepted Waldron's idea that the moral justification for property rights must lead to a redistribution of wealth, even to limitations on the kind of goods that people are allowed to possess.1 He endorsed the idea of collective rights2, and made the usual objections against both the efficiency and the morality of free markets.3
From what I have written about Nino's mentors in this blog, it must be clear that I disagree with him. Nevertheless, Nino was much better than the kind of intellectual that dominates Argentina at the beginning of the 21st century. While Nino provided arguments (flawed in my opinion) academics like Eugenio Zaffaroni use invective and scorn. Nino was under the spell of Oxonian Analytic-Philosophy. Professor Zaffaroni, recently retired from Argentine Federal Supreme Court, is an admirer of Michel Foucault. In fact Nino challenged Zaffaroni's theories in a very instructive debate. No academic seems able to find courage to do it today.
In the 80's, Nino's friend and like-minded liberal Genaro Carrió had a very civilized debate with Sebastián Soler, a “liberal” in the 19th century sense. At the beginning of the 21's century, Soler is simply dismissed and insulted. The change in the ideas that dominate Argentine universities is made clear by the fact that Nino's main disciple, professor Roberto Gargarella, is a Marxist.4


Nino against spontaneous order

In his book Foundations of Constitutional Law (Fundamentos de Derecho Constitucional) Nino defended the notion of “positive” rights –sometimes called economic and social rights– that is, rights to a positive delivery of goods or services, usually from the government. In that context, he charged against Hayek's notion of a spontaneous order. He asserted that it was false and based on a series of confusions. Nino argued (I translate from p. 399) that “the market's order is based on the structure of property which, as it is obvious, is established by statutes deliberately dictated which validate certain acts of possession and transmission of goods -which may have not been recognized by them- and attribute to these acts certain rights and obligations -which may have been given different effects- statutes that establish punishments against those who interfere with those rights. Secondly, these statutes are enforced by courts and the police who are sustained by the product of the obligation to pay taxes. In the third place, the market works through contracts which demand statutes, courts, officials, and taxes to sustain them. In fact, to a greater autonomy of individuals it must correspond a larger State interventionism in the form of contract execution. And as more causes of contractual nullity are recognized, there will be less State interference, in the form of a negative to provide the public service of coercion to enforce those contracts”.


What is spontaneous order?

It is clear to me that Nino failed to understand Hayek's argument. First of all, he failed to see what is spontaneous: it is nothing less that the very activity that drives the life of a nation. Laws establish the formalities of contracts and how they are enforced, but they neither establish the purposes of these contracts nor the kind and quantities of things that people buy and sell. Statutes regulate the rights of inventors and innovators, but they neither create those inventions nor decide which of them will be successful in the market.
The French economist Frederic Bastiat pointed out that we should marvel at the fact that a big city like Paris is provided with all sorts of food, clothing for summer and winter, tools, bolts, cigarettes, and toys, without any authority's decision about how much fruit, flour, shirts, overcoats, pliers, and teddy bears are to be produced. Nobody decides how many trucks are needed to move all these goods. Nevertheless, they arrive in time, each one in proper quantities, and very little is wasted. That is the fundamental spontaneous order. That is the order on which the well-being of people, often their very survival, depends. But we don't marvel at it, it is so essential to our lives and so pervasive that we take it for granted.
Moreover, experience shows that it is precisely when authorities decide that they can impose a better order and take to themselves the task of deciding how much flour and shirts will be made that these goods become scarce and poorly made. Socialists of all parties seldom learn from these experiences; they don't stop and think about the odd fact that life went better without their orders. As they are unable to conceive that order might be spontaneous the only lesson they learn from disaster and hunger is that next time they will appoint better planners and regulators.
In Italy, Fascists thought that they had found a better way than marxists and socialists: production would be regulated by boards of employers and employees. They created corporations where each group in society (or rather, the groups in which they thought society was divided) had a place reserved, no matter how many votes they would have had in a regular election. That system didn't work either. Nevertheless, in Argentina a large number of people still believe that order would be better established if only the representatives of each relevant “sector” of society agreed to “sat down to a table” (that is the set phrase), have a talk, arrange their differences, and issue a plan that would secure everyone's well-being.
Plan by a single authority is bad; plan by committee is worse. What must be understood is that the problem is not how or by whom these decisions are made; the problem is that such order won't be spontaneous.
Furthermore, we must be aware that “spontaneous” does not mean “thoughtless”. There is much more thought and care involved in spontaneous order than in any plan or regulation. Except that they are the thoughts and goals of millions of people who interact and adapt to each other without anyone bossing them about and telling what they have to do.
Hayek wrote in his book Law, Legislation, and Liberty: “The possibility of men living together in peace and to their mutual advantage without having to agree on common concrete aims, and bound only by abstract rules of conduct, was perhaps the greatest discovery mankind ever made” (vol. 2, p. 136). That is the fundamental spontaneous order, the one that is defined by the fact that it requires no agreement on collective goals. Marxists, Nazis, corporatists, nationalists, and socialists of various kinds, thought (and still think today) that such common goals are indispensable. They can't conceive an order without them. So fundamental are they for these groups, their leaders, and intellectuals, that in default of agreement they are prepared to force people to adhere to their goals. That they describe them as national purposes, race world-views, or class interests, is –according to Hayek– secondary to the fact that all of these doctrines reject an order that is spontaneous and has not to be directed.
It is sad that well educated people and even academics like Nino fail to see that they get most of the goods that made life enjoyable –even possible– by an order that is spontaneous. The essential order to which Bastiat, Menger, and Hayek pointed out is not the system of laws, which of course they acknowledged, but the order that is established when millions of individual plans –each one different!– adapt to each other.

The legal system

But even laws and codes have much that is spontaneous. Nobody invented the notion of a contract, or of credit, or of paid services. Today we have laws about such things, but the practice, and the very concepts, originated long before those laws. Some people started exchanging food, firewood, or tools, and many others realized that they could improve their well-being in that way.
They started using some forms, some words, ceremonies, and written documents for their agreements. Some thought that it would be a good idea to produce things they didn't need, just in order to exchange them for goods they needed. That is the beginning of specialization and the division of labor. Many of them found that there are certain goods that are readily accepted by most people, goods that are easy to transport, and don't get spoiled by the passing of time. Whenever they were uncertain about their future needs, or whenever they couldn't find the products they needed, they chose to exchange their products for those goods, as an intermediate step. These were, with various degrees of success, chunks of salt, hides, spices, gold, silver, and many other things. That is, according to the Austrian economist Carl Menger, the origin of money. In time, laws established coins and much later, paper money. But contracts, wills, marriage, property, and money started spontaneously, as parts of an order that laws secured and modified but seldom (if ever) they created.
Socialists of all parties prise themselves for their realism, nevertheless they seem to assume that nobody exchanged berries for firewood, nobody left his cows to his children, before some authority called people from the villages and adjacent farms and told them that from then on they will have an institution called “contract” and another called “will”.
Those who write statutes and codes find these things already working; they settle some things, modify others, but seldom invent a new practice from scratch. Even in the introduction of the French Civil Code, the jurist Portalis wrote that “codes are made by time, but to speak more properly, one does not make them”.

1 See his Fundamentos de Derecho Constitucional (Foundations of Constitutional Law) p. 364.
2 Op. cit. p. 371.
3 Op. cit. p. 372-373.
4 A translator and follower of British Marxist Gerald Cohen.

Tuesday, March 24, 2015

Argentina, the rift between the Court and the President



At the end of her second term, Argentina's President Cristina Kirchner accuses judges, and especially the Supreme Court, of plotting against her. For their part, and after long years of awkward silence, some judges and public prosecutors seem to have recovered their eyesight and are investigating cases of embezzlement, money laundering, and abuse of power that reach the president, her son, as well as some very fortunate new millionaires who are said to be their front-men. On top of that, Alberto Nisman, the prosecutor appointed to investigate the bomb attack perpetrated in 1994 against the Jewish community AMIA building, accused Cristina Kirchner of plotting together with the Iranian government to cover-up the crime. Worst of all, the day before Nisman had to present his charges in Congress he was found dead in his apartment. The government never sent a word of solidarity to his widow and two little daughters.
All that is in the news. Nevertheless, the present rift between the federal judiciary and the President should not hide the fact that the Supreme Court has decided every key case in favor of Kirchner's government. It is important to set the record straight. Those who admire the Kirchner's regime will be less inclined to criticize the Court. On the other hand, those who deplore their government will be more realistic in their evaluation of the Court's role.

How the new Supreme Court was born

In December 2001 a civilian coup toppled President Fernando de la Rua. Congress was dominated by his enemies, both in the Peronist party and even more virulently in his own party, the Radical party (which, in Argentina, is a center-left moderate party). There was some haggling over the succession, and Argentina had 4 presidents appointed successively by Congress in 10 days. Though people in the streets demanded elections to replace the fallen government, it was decided not to risk it. Instead, and by an overwhelming majority, Congress finally chose the candidate who had lost the election against de la Rua, the Peronist Eduardo Duhalde.
The new government decided to take the dollars people had in their bank accounts. That was rather unexpected because, beside other grievances, the immediate motive for the protests against de la Rua -which led to his demise- had been the limits his government had imposed on the amount of cash people could withdraw from their bank accounts -limit that concerned cash, but not other ways of disposing of their savings. Instead, the newly elected government took people's dollars and gave bonds in exchange. A law to that effect was duly approved in Congress by the same combination of forces that toppled the former president.
Perhaps already longing the times when they protested against mere limits on cash withdrawal, many Argentines went to the courts reclaiming their dollars, and they won their cases. After a while, appeals reached the federal Supreme Court. The judges said that in taking the dollars, the government had violated article 17th of the federal Constitution which states that "property is inviolable". One of the first cases was "Smith" and it was followed by "San Luis" (link to the Court's site1). This latter case was peculiar because it involved a provincial government suing the federal government in order to recover its dollars –the federal government had taken even the dollars that belonged to one of the states (provinces) that form Argentina. The Supreme Court decided in favor of San Luis.
By that time Eduardo Duhalde had been replaced by Néstor Kirchner, also a Peronist, elected president in 2003 with president Duhalde's patronage. In fact Kirchner had lost the election's first round, but then the winner –Carlos Menem– retired from the contest and Kirchner was appointed president without a second run. Meanwhile, with their decisions confirmed by the highest court of the land, lower courts were piling up thousands of sentences against the government and in favor of the right of people to their savings in foreign currency. Then Kirchner, again with the support of both the Peronist and Radical parties, decided to change the Supreme Court.

The new Court changes course

Then Congress accused some of the judges of the old Court of having been subservient to a previous (Menem's) government. Nevertheless, some argued that the real problem was that they had refused to be subservient to the new government. Under pressure, three of the judges retired –one argued “moral exhaustion”, another denounced an attempt against his life. Two others refused to retire and were removed by Congress, still dominated by the same forces that brought down Fernando de la Rua's government. The Attorney General, whose legal report to the Court had supported the saver's claims, resigned too and was replaced by a former Peronist minister. Newspapers, TV channels, and radio unanimously celebrated those decisions. Now Argentina would have a Court that would be independent from a previous government!
The first three seats thus emptied where filled by appointing judges Maqueda, Highton, and Zaffaroni (the first had been President of the Senate after the coup against de la Rua). The new majority in the Court reversed the course and declared that taking the dollars was according to the Constitution (case "Bustos" 10/26/2004). The judges used the occasion to harshly criticize the former decisions of the Court. They said that they had caused economic and legal chaos. They scourged the savers who had gone to the courts and had already recovered their dollars saying that they had obtained an unfair privilege. They criticized the economic measures of the two previous governments. They declared that the so-called property over dollars was “a big fallacy” and gave two reasons to support that conclusion (paragraph 9, majority's opinion):
1. Argentines don't earn their salaries in dollars
2. To exchange Argentine pesos for dollars in currency exchange offices was possible only in border countries, but not further away
I mention this reasoning because it is a good example of the kind of economic analysis often displayed by the Argentine Supreme Court. Certainly, the first argument should have alerted other courts around the globe of similar fallacies: Swedes don't earn their salaries in dollars, nor do Russians, Chinese, Japanese, or Lithuanians. They might be told that their savings in foreign currencies have been transformed into bonds by the force of a syllogism.
The second argument was considered by many Argentines a decisive proof of the fallacy. The Court simply repeated that piece of popular wisdom. I remember that a man told me that at Paris airport he had tried to pay for a cup of coffee with pesos, and that the waiter had refused them and demanded Euros. The man adopted that shrewd expression Argentines show in the many occasions in which they unearth such global conspiracies and told me that evidently the parity between peso and dollar had been a big lie concocted by banks and the media for more than ten years. Of course, he as well as the judges confused the readiness with which a currency is accepted and its exchange value. They didn't realize that they couldn't have paid for the cup of coffee with Swiss Francs, Yens, or Swedish Krona. Moreover, what was that supposed to prove? That all those currencies not accepted by waiters have no value, zero value? The waiter in the story didn't ask for a more favorable exchange rate, he simply rejected the foreign currency. I failed to convince the man that he was mistaken. No doubt, the savers failed to convince the judges.
Concurring with the majority, judge Zaffaroni, the closest to the new government among the new members of the Court, said that those economists who had given advice to the two previous administrations should be criminally persecuted.
After further places had been emptied, two new judges, Lorenzetti and Argibay, filled them. Then, the new Court in full ratified the precedent "Bustos" and again declared that taking the dollars was right (precedent "Massa"). But these two new judges weren't so assertive in their support to the government's right to the savings of the population. They produced very odd opinions: using only general words, judge Lorenzetti warned that it would be necessary to think carefully about the negative consequences of the Court's long tradition of "tolerance" (his word) for emergency laws that make inroads into property rights. He recalled the example of old cases in which, although in single dissenting opinions, a few judges firmly supported property rights. Nevertheless, he sided with the new majority.
Judge Argibay's opinion was even more peculiar: she explained at length why the presidential decree that commanded banks to give dollars in private accounts to the government was against the Constitution and even declared that the saver had the right on his side. Nevertheless, in a short final paragraph she said that for "institutional reasons" (her words) it was "prudent" (idem) to reject the claim. That was perhaps one of the strangest opinions ever issued in the history of the Supreme Court.
More perplexities were added when in 2007 the Court admitted –with one dissenting opinion– a claim for the dollars that had been deposited in a bank during the course of a trial (case “EMM S.R.L.”). It often happens that in a trial some party has to deposit money in a State owned bank, sometimes to pay for expenses, sometimes as a caution, etc. Money in those accounts cannot be extracted without authorization of the judge in charge of the case. In “EMM”, the Supreme Court said that the government couldn't take these dollars from their bank accounts without violating the Constitution. What was the difference with common bank deposits in dollars? The Court declared that judges have to protect the goods put under their custody –a duty which apparently they limited to such goods. And they added that if the government took those dollars, it would violate not only property rights but the independence of the judiciary.
In my Spanish blog I have included a detailed analysis of the Court's ruling2. In short, we must conclude that in “EMM” the judges considered that their duty of protecting deposits in foreign currency made during trials was different from that other –which they must have deemed much weaker– of protecting dollars deposited in any other bank account, or of property in general.

The government takes retirement savings

A law passed in 1994 allowed workers to choose between a State managed retirement system and private accounts administered by companies known in Argentina by the acronym AFJP (Pension Fund Administrators, similar systems exist in many countries). While in the first scheme money enters a common fund that the government uses for many purposes besides paying pensions, in those privately administered ones each saver had an individual account. The law stated that money in those accounts belonged to each saver and that they could be left as property to heirs.
These private funds had invested in Argentine bonds –a law had forced them to do it–, so the future pensioners were among the main creditors of the State's defaulted debt. In December 2007, at the end of Néstor Kirchner's term, Cristina Kirchner was elected to replace her husband. A year later, she decided to take the retirement savings held by people in their individual accounts. In this way, together with many other assets, the government took possession of its own bonds and the debt was wiped out.
Some savers sued the government and in March 2013 one of these cases reached the Supreme Court (this was of course, the new Court). The judges rejected the claim3. Their decision is remarkable for its brevity, just three lines. The judges said that they shared the Attorney General's advice against the saver. Certainly, it isn't unusual that in very simple cases and for brevity's sake the Court just asserts that it shares the Attorney General's reasoning. But never before had a case of such importance been decided that way. Though the case directly concerned a single saver, in fact it decided the fate of about ten million future pensioners, thousands of millions of dollars, assets in Argentina as well as investments abroad, and in fact the future of the whole pension system.
Just three lines. And what was the reasoning provided by the Attorney General that the judges found so convincing? He said that though the law stated that savings in individual accounts in pension funds belonged in property to each saver, that wasn't really property, so the government wasn't really violating the Constitution's clause that protects property (art. 17 “...property is inviolable...”). Why wasn't it property? It wasn't because saving for future retirement was compulsory. Though such savings remained in a private account that the law distinctly declared as property, it wasn't money that the saver could use immediately, he couldn't touch it before he retired, and that proved –according to this argument– that the account in the pension fund wasn't really property.
The case received little attention in the media and only a few perfunctory articles were published about it in law reviews.

The battle for the control of mass media

In June 2009 Cristina Kirchner's government lost the legislative elections and therefore its hegemony in both houses of Argentina's Congress. Her husband and former president Néstor Kirchner had lost the elections in the most important province, Buenos Aires. Two months later, the government presented a draft for a law to regulate the mass media: television and radio. This was called “the mother of all battles”. As it was announced, the purpose of the law was to fight the few so-called monopolies that shared the biggest part of the audience in detriment of others –the State owned channel being among those less favored by the public. The government proposed to limit the number of viewers and listeners that each broadcasting company could reach, thus establishing a fair partition of the audience among them. The law was approved in Congress though most of the opposition chose not to be present. Nevertheless, as it has been the case in many other issues, their objections didn't concern the main points in the law and were related to matters of form.
A major media company, the Clarín group, sued in defense of its broadcasting license. After having supported the Kirchner's government for some years, they had become one of their main critics. The case finally reached the Supreme Court. By a majority of 4 to 1 (and 2 others in between, with partially dissenting opinions) the judges decided that the law was constitutional.4
The objections against the new statute covered both its main technique of dividing the audience among companies and the fact that it violated broadcasting licenses still in vigor. The law forced Clarín to “disinvest” (that was the word in the new statute), to shrink its size, well before its licenses had finished. As mentioned, 4 judges said all was unobjectionable, 1 said both things were against the Constitution, 1 said that though the main system was OK, the government had to wait till the licenses granted under the previous law had finished, and 1 also said that the government had to wait, but that it was better for the Court to postpone its decision about whether the system was constitutional till that time. That last opinion was judge Argibay's and was remarkable because there won't be any future occasion to discuss the matter. Judge Argibay must have understood perfectly well that, as all the other judges gave their views concerning the objections against the main system, the plaintiff won't have another chance to challenge the statute.
In total, there were 5 judges who said that the limits to the number of people who can view a TV channel or listen to some radio broadcaster don't affect freedom of expression. Judge Fayt said it did (judge Argibay dodged the issue). The majority's argument was that the size of the public anyone can reach isn't relevant. Judge Maqueda asked, isn't it true that the freedom enjoyed by a little local radio station is no different from that of a big media company? Both are free. So if a law forces the latter to shrink to the size of the former, freedom of expression in itself isn't violated. As long as some way of expressing one's opinions is preserved, there is no constitutional objection, only a matter of size. The majority said that as long as a media company isn't “asphyxiated” by regulation (their word, pages 11, 38, 94 of the sentence), freedom isn't affected.
Furthermore, the judges distinguished between what they called individual and collective freedom of expression. The first is simply the right to voice one's opinions. The judges acknowledged that in that respect, restrictions must be carefully scrutinized. On the other hand, there is a collective freedom: that of those who may listen to those opinions. In that respect, State regulation may be more “intense”(the judges' word, page 38).
The judges used yet another distinction: they said that there are two ways to fight monopolies. Government can suppress them if and when they appear, or –without waiting for that– it can regulate beforehand how people can access information so that they receive a well balanced stream of information (page 36). I have dedicated two articles to the Court's decision in my Spanish blog. There I argued that in fact, these aren't two different techniques, but two different goals. To monitor and shape the kind of information the population receives (checking whether it is fair and balanced, according to the authorities) is a goal very different from that –much more limited– of fighting monopolies. In his dissenting opinion, judge Fayt said that to replace people's judgment with that of the authorities is the essence of unconstitutional paternalism (page 338).
Judge Zaffaroni, always more prone to ideological pronouncements, concurred with the majority and said that nobody can doubt that the mass media has an influence on people's ideas, tastes, fears, stereotypes, aesthetic judgment, even people's language and existential goals. He said that dominant economic groups may make people more culturally homogeneous, in detriment of diversity. He concluded that in a time in which technology changes communication in revolutionary ways, a government that leaves that power to monopolies commits “cultural suicide” (page 77).

General indifference, no debate of ideas

Most Argentines have shown no interest in the cases here reviewed. Journalists have covered them as battles where the only relevant question is, Who is the winner, who has managed to impose his will? Though the Court's decisions are easily accessible on the web, journalists never cared to look at them and examine the reasons presented by each side. Only a few academics published some articles in law reviews.
The Argentine legal philosopher Carlos Santiago Nino, many times cited by the Court itself, wrote that Argentines suffer from anomie, a lack of interest about their own future.5 Nino died before any of these Court controversies took place, but in them he would have found ample justification for his remark.
This post is not the place to analyze why so many Argentines limit their attention to soccer. Nevertheless, I will add that even among politicians and academics, the debates seldom tackle fundamental questions. And when there is a rift, it often takes place between people who share the same fundamental view. They only dispute who is better prepared to realize it. People who have struggled together for power often become bitter enemies once they conquer it.


1These and other cases commented here can be found in full text in the Argentina's Supreme Court web site (in Spanish): www.csjn.gov.ar/data/em_econom2.pdf. This is a document that collects most of the cases related to emergency decrees and laws.

3Case R. 37. XLVI. RHE; ROSSI PABLO ARIEL c/ ESTADO NACIONAL - MINISTERIO DE TRABAJO EMPLEO Y SEGURIDAD SOCIAL Y OTROS Y OTRO s/AMPAROS Y SUMARISIMOS; 26/03/2013. Unfortunately, there is no direct link to the decision. Nevertheless, it can be retrieved from the search page of the Supreme Court: http://servicios.csjn.gov.ar/confal/ConsultaCompletaFallos.do?method=iniciaConsulta
4There are two detailed articles about this decision in my Spanish blog, as well as a link to the full text of the sentence (all in Spanish): http://arielbarbero.blogspot.com.ar/2013/11/conceptos-juridicos-del-fallo-clarin.html and http://arielbarbero.blogspot.com.ar/2013/11/derechos-adquiridos-y-ley-de-medios.html



5Nino, Carlos Santiago: Un país al margen de la ley [A country outside the law] published in 2005, many years after his death.

Tuesday, February 17, 2015

Argentina abandons legality, by law


Argentina's new Civil Code formally rejects the rule of law

     In October 2014 Cristina Kirchner's government enacted a new Civil Code replacing the one that had been in vigor since 1871. The old code was one of many magnificent legacies left by the generation that once made Argentina the 6th economy in the world. Now Argentines have decided to reject that legacy, formally, by law.
     In fact the old code had been rejected by Argentine doctrinaires long ago. Now that rejection has become a law, a new Code. This is the doctrinaires' final victory, the end of their long struggle against the principles of liberty protected by precise rules in the old code. As far back as the 1930s, coinciding with the shift of the majority of Argentine intellectuals from "old fashioned" liberalism to "modern" nationalism, statism, and interventionism, they started a relentless campaign for the abrogation of the old code. Their tactic was two-pronged: law professors promoted new imaginative interpretations of the old rules, more in line with the ideas they deemed progressive -and judges adopted them with gusto. At the same time, conscious that their constructions were highly dubious, they clamored for a new code that would truly adopt the new doctrines.
     For that reason, and during many decades, law students were introduced by their professors to a very odd scenario: they were told that a new and better code would soon replace the old one, but that such substitution would change nothing. Why? because the old rules -correctly interpreted- already coincided with those proposed to replace them.


Article 1066: old-fashioned freedom


     One of the most offensive principles in the old code was article 1066, placed at the very beginning of the code's section on torts (for non-lawyers: torts are actions against the law for which the wrong-doer has to compensate the victim, paying for the damages caused).
     Article 1066 stated that if you haven't done anything forbidden by law, then you couldn't be condemned to pay damages to anyone. That sounds pretty reasonable: if you keep yourself within the law, you are free from claims from anyone. How uncertain would you fate be it you couldn't be sure of that!
     Nevertheless, it had to go. The principle is squarely against the authoritarian statist doctrines that became fashionable in Argentina in the 1930s and still prevail.  Law professors such as Borda, Llambías, Alterini, Bueres (to mention only a few at the top of the academic pyramid) argued that it was unacceptable that the powers of judges and their desire to impose justice would be restrained merely because Congress had been slow in passing a law forbidding some action. Wouldn't it be better to allow judges the liberty to decide according to their good sense, beyond the law, and enlightened by the new doctrines about a modern society's needs?
     The reader may have noticed that this new liberty for judges means an equivalent lack of liberty for the common man.
     Following another line of attack law professors complained that it was too cumbersome to require a law in order to make something illegal, as did article 1066 of the old Civil Code. Why not a presidential decree or a regulation issued by some ministry? In the old times, before statism seized Argentina, it was thought that the president alone -much less his ministers- couldn't make something illegal thereby forcing anyone to pay damages for it. But that restriction was considered inappropriate for modern times, a relic from the 19th century, from the times of the much detested liberalism. It had to go.


An illusory safeguard against arbitrariness


     The new code was enacted in October 2014 and will rule Argentina starting in August 1, 2015 -though some judges couldn't control their excitement and began citing its provisions even before it had been approved by Congress. 
     The new code removes the hated restriction on the powers of judges: now they can condemn people to pay damages without even asserting that they had violated any law. Nevertheless, people are told that it doesn't mean that they are absolutely at the mercy of the good or bad sense of judges. There is a safeguard: an action that constitutes the exercise of a right cannot be considered a tort, and consequently cannot provide grounds for compensation. 
     That safeguard is considerably weakened by the caveat, also included in the code, that rights must be exercised according to the goals pursued by the entire legal order (including not just laws but also presidential decrees, ministerial orders, etc.). So you don't simply use your rights to pursue your own goals, you have to consider those of the legal order (whatever that may mean). This is an extension of the idea, long ago adopted by most Argentine doctrinaires, that property rights are "social functions" rather than individual rights. Now every right will be subject to the same limitation. 


The logical contradiction in the new code


     But even if we leave aside that weakening proviso about the meaning and substance of rights, the alleged safeguard involves a logical contradiction. I have written about it at length in a book (1) and in many articles in La Ley Law Review -one of the most prestigious in Argentina. To this date, no answer has been given, no way out of the contradiction has been shown.
     The contradiction is this: the new code states that one can be condemned without having violated any law, though not if one was exercising one's rights. But that may mean two very different things: 
      a) Do I need a right that I have purchased, or rented, or inherited from my parents, or that was given to me in any other way? That is called a "subjective right" in continental jurisprudence -a "title" is perhaps the closest common-law version. 
      b) Or is it enough that by "exercising a right" we mean that I do whatever isn't forbidden by law, that is, what we call "freedom"?
     The first alternative is horrible: it would mean that I could do only what is expressly granted to me. Nobody has dared to openly defend that monstrous system. 
     The second alternative is more reasonable: it means that I can do whatever is not forbidden by law without fear of any claim against my pocket. But if the new code means this, it has returned by a circuitous and confusing road to the old system: to the much reviled old fashioned notion that there can be no tort unless one does what the law forbids. 
     The answer of the new code to this fundamental question about the powers of authorities and the liberties of people is -to say the least- uncertain. The principle that guards liberty in the old code is formally rejected. Nevertheless, a limit to judicial arbitrariness is provided that involves a contradiction: it means either that the old principle has not really been rejected, or that Argentina has inadvertently adopted a monstrous system in which everything that is not expressly allowed to people is forbidden to them.
     An idle logician might argue that the new system is still based on the rule of law: precisely on the legal rule that authorizes judges to condemn people who have violated no law. But by now we should have learned the lessons taught by Hayek: the rule of law has nothing to do with the fact that some majority has enacted some arbitrary rule.


Preserving legal concepts for future generations

Criticism of the new code has been limited to the many innovations it introduces in family law and concerning the manipulation of human embryos. The Catholic Church succeeded in their opposition against some of these changes. But the population as a whole has shown no interest in these limited debates. It was the same lack of concern they showed when in 1994 the Federal Constitution was changed. Then the innovations went from new rules for elections to new governing bodies for the judiciary. Reverse discrimination was made mandatory by the Constitution itself. But why should people care? What does it have to do with soccer? 
     During most of the 20th century, too many Argentines yawned while they were deprived of liberties that other peoples defended with their lives. In this new century, the changes that weaken the rule of law have received very little attention, even by academics. Or rather, law professors and politicians have celebrated the new code as the long delayed victory of their modern doctrines. But let's be clear: these are the same doctrines that were modern when first adopted in the 1930s, when Argentina's long decay started. It is no coincidence. 
     Though at present it may seem unlikely, nobody can rule out that in one or two generations (or in ten) there would be again in this land a keen concern for the principles of freedom. At that time, Argentines will need precise concepts, non contradictory reasoning, and a knowledge of history. Law is a complex science in which errors are paid dearly. We cannot progress if we disregard what past generations have learned. People cannot invent locomotives without knowledge of the wheel. I hope I may have contributed to preserve a portion of that knowledge for the future.

(1) Ariel Emilio Barbero: La Responsabilidad Civil. Volver a los límites del Código Civil. Ed. La Ley 2001. The book dealt with a proposal which, on the issue commented in the post, was substantially similar to the one now made into a new Code. In turn, that proposal had been preceded by similar ones along the decades.