Wednesday, November 9, 2011

Who needs a replacement for Marxism?

This is the last article on the theories defended by Murphy and Nagel in the book The Myth of Ownership
At the end of The Myth of Ownership, Murphy and Nagel put their own ideas in historical context: “In the aftermath of the century during which the Marxist conception of equality played itself out, at enormous cost, the question is whether a different kind of egalitarian social ideal, one no intrinsically incompatible with capitalist economic institutions, can take hold in the Western democracies”.[1] Certainly Marxism has lost a considerable part of the luster it enjoyed for too long. But there is hardly a need for a replacement.
Actually, Marxism played itself out as a theory long before it was tried on people. Its many mistakes had been clearly demonstrated by the Austrian economist Eugene Böhm-Bawerk before the XIX century had come to an end (link to his article on the Marxist system). It was not necessary to try the poison on people. But it was tried. Then again, once it had produced the famines, the massacres, the show trials, the Gulag system of forced labor, it was not necessary to wait for decades till it finally crumbled in a pile of shame, to reach the conclusion that it was dead wrong. It was so from the start to those who suffered under it.
To many of those educated in the universities of the West, at long last, Marxism starts to look slightly less convincing; a bit less obviously true –though a poll conducted in Britain by BBC 4 in 2005, on its audience, gave Marx as the most important philosopher in history, well ahead of the rest. In other countries, large numbers of people adhere to Marx’s theories about exploitation and class struggle, but without caring about the origins of their ideas. In the US, however, the results of a poll similar to the one conducted by the BBC would have been different.
Marx thought that he had found a fundamental economic objection against capitalism. Against a system that was creating wealth and increasing population as never before in history, Marx did not use altruism and moral arguments (as, for instance, John Ruskin did). Marx thought that socialist production would be more efficient and avoid the contradictions he thought he had discovered in capitalism. Since Bohm-Bawerk’s article on the Marxian system, every informed economist knows that Marx had deluded himself –and misguided millions of people. Nevertheless, many economists and philosophers try to succeed where Marx failed: they try to show that capitalism is inefficient and must be corrected by the exercise of political power. They write theses that would prove that they have unearthed inefficiencies in the form of services wanted but not provided, public goods, free riders, natural monopolies, and a host of justifications for increasing intervention. It has become the surest path to a Nobel Prize in economics.
Murphy and Nagel think that their proposals could be accepted even in the US. They say that their theory is compatible with capitalism, or at least with some sort of capitalism. After all, they write “there is no natural or ideal market. There are many different kinds of market system, all equally free, and the choice among them will turn on a range of independent policy judgments”. Here, “independent” means: the decision should be taken independently of the value one may see in having a market system.
But what are the different free markets they have in mind? We must remember that highly praised thinkers would allow considerable latitude in the choice of the different kinds of market system: as said, John Rawls thought it natural to assume that free markets may or may not have private ownership of the means of production.[2] We do not know whether Murphy and Nagel would share Rawls’s view: their words about what must be left in private hands for the system to qualify as free market are vaguer than that of the master. But vagueness about “hindrances” and “conditions” is not a way to reconcile their theory with capitalism. At the very least, we must remember that Murphy and Nagel admit the morality of private property only in the form of a Hegelian minimum.
When we consider compatibilities and contradictions, we must understand that we are not assessing whether capitalism would survive a single day after theories like those of Murphy and Nagel are adopted, or would fall immediately. Of course, if all means of production are taken by the government, the market is killed –and Rawls’s assertion to the contrary will not keep it alive a single second. But there is also a slow death caused by “conditions” and “hindrances” incompatible with freedom. When we say, for instance, that heavy drinking is incompatible with a career in sports, we do not say that a successful sportsman will fail the day after he starts drinking too much. A very gifted individual may overcome some of the worst consequences for some time. But there is nevertheless a contradiction, something that drags him down, and it would be better for the drinker to recognize it as such. To be sure, a mangled market would work, some capital would be accumulated under the worst conditions, and inventiveness would fight bureaucracies for a long time. But, as with the sportsman, things would never be what they could have been.
It is worth noticing that Hegel himself did not suggest that property should be divided between a minimum that deserves full legal protection as a right, and another larger portion that lacks it. There is nothing in Hegel’s justification of property rights that restricts it to some portion of goods. Anyway, it would be of historical interest to discuss whether it is fair to attribute to him that distinction but, of course, it would not settle the question whether it makes sense.
For their part, Murphy and Nagel assume that the distinction is quite obvious, and tell us that the right to do whatever we want with a minimum of personal belongings does not cover “the freedom to engage with minimal hindrance or conditions in significant economic activity of the sort that drives a market economy”.[3] Now, what is capitalism if we take from it the freedom related to the significant activity that drives it? Steve Jobs would have been allowed to drive his car, but not Apple; Cornelius Vanderbilt would have been allowed to do what he wanted with a small boat, but not with his ship company.
Murphy and Nagel trace a line: any encroachment upon the Hegelian minimum would need exceptionally strong justification from the government, but not if it applies to property that is larger than that: “Some forms of personal discretion –including the basic Hegelian right to hold personal property– are at the core of the self, but unimpeded economic freedom is not one of them”.[4] They repeat it: “While the protection of some form of private property is an essential part of human freedom, the overall structure of the system of property rights should be determined largely on other grounds”.[5] That is to say, they are not part of human freedom.
Again we recognize that lack of perspective that we encountered in the discussion about incentives for work. It may be true that personal property like a comfortable house, a good salary paid by a prestigious university, a car, a personal library, and a few other things may be enough to allow a philosopher to pursue happiness. But Henry Bessemer –the inventor of mild steel– needed smelters; and Henry Ford needed production lines; and Robert Noyce –of INTEL– needed semiconductors. A Hegelian minimum would have not been enough for them, and the rest of us is no worse for that.
Certainly, what the debunkers of ownership have in store for capitalism is described in very general words: what is the kind of “hindrance” in the economic decisions of entrepreneurs that the government can impose without need of any strong justification (which would be needed if it affected an undefined Hegelian minimum)? We would not know until it has been imposed. In fact, we cannot expect anything more precise because the decisions that may be necessary to adopt cannot be known in advance, as proper legal rules are and must be. Friedrich Hayek explained long ago that a government that sets about deliberately distributing wealth, taking from some and giving to others, cannot tie itself to rules known in advance.[6] A government that directs its action mostly to the enforcement of general rules leaves to individuals the responsibility of deciding what is best for them according to present and future conditions, as they judge them.  But a government that tries to redistribute wealth must treat people differently, and in order to be effective it must take into account their changing needs. It must decide questions “on the merits”, that is, taking into consideration individual circumstances. It must watch the evolution of the economy, decide who is to get what now, and decide it again next year.
Nothing of that can be asserted in advance. Unless, of course, it is framed in vague words like “fair allocation”, and “reasonable payment” (and “hindrance”), with the usual provisions that “exceptional circumstances” (as judged when they present themselves) may justify distinctions. So, in a way it is not always true that collectivistic politicians and thinkers hide their plans from us in order to avoid resistance. Even if they wanted to be precise about what they will do to us (which is seldom the case) they could not do it.
Capitalism –even of the kind we have, which includes considerable government intervention– will be seriously affected if the theory that guides its course states, like Murphy and Nagel do, that “Evaluation must decide how 'mine' and 'yours' ought to be determined; it cannot start with a set of assumptions about what is mine and what is yours. The right answer will depend on what system best serves the legitimate aims of society with legitimate means an without imposing illegitimate costs”.[7] That evaluation, inevitably, will be left to the government –the legitimate means will be determined in the same way. What is crucial is that to justify or reject the decision –the authors declare– we “cannot appeal, at the fundamental level, to property rights.”[8]
However, we must realize that property rights that are secured against the changes in the “evaluation of what is mine and yours” are a fundamental requisite for capitalism. Murphy and Nagel’s theory is not really compatible with it. Indeed, if such redefinitions of mine and yours were possible, the rule that protects private property in the 5th Amendment of the US Constitution would mean nothing. Nevertheless, professor Waldron writes “The slogan that property is a human right can be deployed only disingenuously to legitimize the massive inequality that we find in modern capitalist countries”.[9]
Murphy and Nagel call the basic tenets of capitalism, “extreme libertarian”,[10] and sometimes, “everyday libertarianism”.[11] This is highly inaccurate. Libertarian-anarchism has never been implemented in the US, and it is not against the remote chance that it would ever be adopted that Murphy and Nagel argue. They reject the usual and general notion of ownership, they call for redistribution of wealth through cash transfers, and they claim that governmental “hindrances” on entrepreneurship do not need strong justification. Their objections apply really to capitalism.

 The tenets of collectivism
As Marxists and Socialists before them, Murphy and Nagel do not see any relevant difference between general rules under which individuals follow different roads (some successfully, some not), and a system that treats individuals differently in order to reduce a gap between their incomes or to achieve some other social goal.
At the end of the day, we are told, both systems are no more than different ways of allocating resources. One of them generates differences of wealth among individuals, the other generates more equality. The main difference lies in the effects. That these effects are the result of free competition or of government’s coercion is an irrelevant detail of no moral significance. After all, if it is true that taxes are imposed on individuals and that they cannot resist them, it is also true that success is imposed on them by luck, social factors, and even genetics. All of that is, in one way or another, external to people.[12]
Moreover, is it not true that coercion is used to prevent and punish robbery? Certainly, welfare payments put money in the pockets of some people after taking it from others –by force if necessary. But policing the streets and punishing criminals makes it possible for money to remain in the pockets of people, who would have been robbed otherwise. It is argued that these are just two ways of using the force of the state. We cannot say that one is substantially different from the other in any respect, apart from the different distribution of wealth that results from them.
Using this strategy, Cass Sunstein rejects the distinction between negative and positive rights. Just to remind the reader: classic rights like ownership and freedom of trade are often called “negative rights” because people exercise them by themselves; laws may protect them against violence and fraud but no law is necessary to exercise them. In contrast, positive rights consist in help that people are entitled to get from the government. Why are they called “positive”? Because their exercise requires, not merely the absence of harm, but a positive transfer of goods and services.
Now we return to Sunstein. There is no essential difference, says he: welfare payments cost money, but so does the justice system. In both cases the government has to spend money.[13] Someone receives help from the government in the form a cash transfer, and another by being defended against robbers and murderers. Of course, the comparison obscures the fact that those who receive cash transfers are also protected against criminals. But if one forgets it, one may be led to think that we just have two different ways of helping different people.
These arguments are seriously presented as a proof that our common understanding of the issues involved rests on mere prejudice. However, even a child recognizes that there is a big difference between begging his mother to carry him in her arms, and walking on his own legs. You may try to convince the child that there is no essential difference, and point out that when he struggled with uncertain steps trying to reach the other side of the room for the first time, mommy was there ready to stop an unruly brother from tripping his legs. You see, there is no real difference, there was help in both cases –there was a condition anyway. If you abandon your childish myths you would realize that being carried or walking yourself are just two different means of locomotion.
A child would not be convinced of that, but an adult might think that he cannot rationally reject the suggestion that ownership is a myth, as it is claimed in books hailed by experts as masterpieces; books brimming with references and lengthy examinations of what people would decide if they were not themselves. The reader of these books might have the vague feeling that there was something wrong somewhere in the arguments, that big and important things have disappeared from his eyes without him knowing how. I have tried to show by what means they disappear.
What Murphy and Nagel dismiss as mere myth, as entirely imaginary, as “morally irrelevant”[14] are some of the basic principles of capitalism. In the past, collectivism used to be forced upon us with the claim that it was historically inevitable. If you wanted to avoid being looked as a hick, you had to acknowledge that property rights and such were myths, part of a superstructure made for the defense of capitalism –which was a contradictory system. Only thick-headed people could delude themselves into thinking that they could answer these arguments.
Today you are told that your attachment to your property is merely a foggy notion that would not resist a thorough philosophical examination. Your resistance is proof of your lack of understanding. Your must avoid to be caught being –in Cass Sunstein words– “comically implausible”. However, again and again, we find that the theories that are hailed as fundamental contributions to our knowledge are really based on reasoning that is shockingly weak. And we find that the “myths” that are to be destroyed are the most fundamental principles that define the modern world. They are those that explain the difference between the age of the Pharaohs and our age.





[1] Pages 188-189.
[2] A Theory of Justice, pages 57 and 137. Harvard University Press. Revised Edition 1999. Also in Distributive Justice: Some Addenda, in Collected Papers, page 159. Harvard University Press. Paperback edition 2001.
[3] P. 64.
[4] P. 66.
[5] P. 45.
[6] The Road to Serfdom, Chapter 6.
[7] P. 75.
[8] Same page.
[9] The Right to Private Property, p. 5.
[10] P. 65.
[11] P. 36.
[12] At the base of many justifications of redistribution lies the odd idea –assumed but never discussed– that individuals must not be considered as individuals (defined as such by their qualities and defects and judged according to them), but as ghosts that later on will receive their own personal characteristics. These are not essential or defining of anything, but accidents that ghosts –the true object of political theory– suffer in their transit to this world. Ghosts must be protected from the morally irrelevant accident that makes them individuals.
[13] The Second Bill of Rights, p. 197. In Argentina, Roberto Gargarella, a law scholar who blends Marxism with constitutional law, repeats Sunstein’s arguments to reject the distinction between negative and positive rights: Carta Abierta sobre la Intolerancia, 51 Siglo XXI Editores 2006.
[14] P. 99.

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